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The Model Penal Code's Conceptual Error on
the Nature of Proximate Cause, and How to
Fix it
Paul H. Robinson*
Abstract
The Model Penal Code reconceptualized proximate cause to see it as
part of the offense culpability requirements rather than as, in the
traditional view, a minimum requirement for the strength of the connection between the actor's conduct and the prohibited result. That
conceptual error, rare in the well-thought-out Model Code, invites
misinterpretation and misapplication of the proximate cause provision,
and can produce improper liability results. The failure is all the more
unfortunate because the Model Penal Code drafters did have an
important improvement to offer in dealing with the challenging issue of
proximate cause. Their jettison of fixed detailed rules in favor of a useful
general standard — “not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense” — could have significantly simplified and improved proximate
cause analysis, but their conceptual error created needless problems
that helped lead most states to reject the Model Penal Code provision.

Where an oense is dened to include a prohibited result, such as
death or property destruction, criminal liability traditionally requires not
only proof of the result but also proof of an adequate causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the result. That required
connection is commonly seen as being of two sorts. First, there must
be a dened logical, physical connection, usually a requirement that
the result would not have occurred “but for” the actor's conduct. This
statement of the required real-world relation is commonly termed the
“factual cause” or “but-for” cause requirement.1
It is also generally agreed that something more is required. Even if
the defendant's conduct is a but-for cause of the prohibited result, he
will not be causally accountable for it unless his conduct is also a
*Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1

See generally Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Criminal Law § 3.2.1 (2d
ed. 2012). A few jurisdictions purport to use a sucient cause test, rather than the
classic necessary cause (but-for cause) test, as the factual cause requirement.
Robinson & Cahil, supra note 1, § 3.21.
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“proximate cause” or “legal cause” of the prohibited result.2 In the
classic example used to illustrate the point, the defendant shoots at
the victim but misses, the victim ees, and twenty blocks later is killed
when a piano being hoisted to an upper window falls on him. The
victim would not have been killed but for the defendant's earlier
conduct in shooting at him, which sent him running to the spot where
the falling piano would hit, but all agree that the strength of the causal
connection is too weak to be a basis for the defendant's causal accountability for the death. In the words of the Model Code, the result is
“too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on
the actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense.”3
There is general agreement, then, on what the criminal liability results
should be in the standard causation cases. The defendant in the falling piano case should be liable only for attempted murder, not murder
— the same result as would occur if the defendant shot and missed
the victim and the victim was never killed by the falling piano. (There is
also general agreement that attempted murder ought to be graded
less seriously than murder, giving practical signicance to the distinction being made here).4
Despite this agreement on the proper results in these cases, the
Model Code drafters have made a rare conceptual error that invites
improper results and seriously confuses clear drafting and rational
conceptualization. In what the drafters call a “fresh approach,” they
treat the issue of proximate cause, as in the falling-piano case, as a
matter of a defendant's culpability as to causing the prohibited result,
rather than as an aspect of the causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the prohibited result.5 Their culpability approach to proximate cause, it is argued here, invites complexity and
confusion that essentially assures errors in interpretation and
application. It creates problems that need not exist, then fails to solve
those self-made problems.
It is not unusual for scholars to criticize the Model Code's positions
on any number of issues. Certainly the Code's underlying distributive
principles — with its tendency to promote crime control through
principles of deterrence and incapacitation even when they conict
2

Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1.

3

Model Penal Code § 2.03(2)(b), 2.03(3)(b).

4

Model Penal Code § 5.05(1). Among scholars, however, this is dissent on this
point, with some arguing that resulting harm ought not be signicant. And a few codes
claim to hold resulting harm signicance in oenses less serious than murder. See
generally Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, § 11.0.2.
5

Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 254, 258, 260. For example,
the Commentary explains: “[T]he Code proceeds on the assumption that [proximate
cause] issues ought to be dealt with as problems of the culpability required for
conviction and not as problems of ‘causation.’ ’’ Model Penal Code Ocial
Commentaries § 2.03, at 258.
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with just deserts — are often maligned, but the Code is generally
acknowledged to be a thoughtful and carefully drafted document,
whose provisions usually logically follow from its well-conceptualized
underlying principles. So it is somewhat unusual to see such a
conceptual error.
I. The Model Code's Causation Provision, and Its Restructuring
Model Penal Code section 2.03 is reproduced below in Graphic 1.
Subsection (1), with the double-line border, concerns the standard
but-for cause issue (along with the standard provision in subsection
(1)(b) providing that an oense denition might introduce additional
causation requirements unique to that oense). The second traditional
causation requirement — proximate cause — is also reected in Section 2.03. As noted above, the Code is not insensitive to the proximate
cause issue, and includes its proximate-cause language — “too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense” — in subsections (2)(b)
and (3)(b), bordered with the non-bold dotted line.
But this proximate cause language is included in a subsection whose
focus is the defendant's culpable state of mind, and there lies the
problem. Why should proximate cause be conceptualized as part of
the requirement of culpability as to causing a prohibited result, rather
than as an independent requirement about the relation between the
actor's conduct and the prohibited result?
Let me give some general background regarding the requirement of
a culpable state of mind as to causing a prohibited result. As a basic
operating principle, the Code (properly) requires that the defendant
have some culpable state of mind, as dened in section 2.02, as to
every objective element. Indeed, even if no such culpability is expressly
stated in an oense denition,6 a general provision directs that it be
essentially read in as an oense element.7 When an oense includes a
result element, then, it is not enough that the defendant caused the
prohibited result, it must also be shown that at the time of his conduct
causing it he had a culpable state of mind as to causing it. If the death
of another human being is the prohibited result, for example, he may
be liable for murder if he was purposeful or knowing as to causing the
death, liable for reckless homicide, manslaughter, if he was reckless
as to causing death, and liable for negligent homicide if he was
negligent as to causing death.8
But there are cases where a defendant might not actually have the
required culpable state of mind as to causing the prohibited result, but
we nonetheless believe that he is properly treated as if he possessed
6

Model Penal Code § 2.02(1).

7

Model Penal Code § 2.02(3).

8

Model Penal Code §§ 210 to 210.4.
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it. For example, if he tries to kill the victim but ends up only maiming
him, he ought not be able to defend against a charge of maiming by
claiming that he had no intent at all to maim the victim; his actual
intention was to kill the victim cleanly. Or he ought not be able to
defend against a charge of murder of Victim A by claiming that he was
actually intending to kill Victim B, who was standing adjacent to A. The
Code addresses these kinds of cases in Subsections (2)(a) and (3)(a),
bordered with the bold single line, where it directs that the culpable
state of mind required by the oense denition should essentially be
imputed to the defendant in such cases. The required element is satised if:

1314
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There is general agreement as to the propriety of this kind of imputation of a required culpable state of mind, which has been termed
“substituted mental elements,”9 although some states do not have an
express codication of the doctrine.10 The defendant's intention to kill
is an adequate basis on which to justly impute to him the less serious
intention to maim. His intention to kill A is an adequate basis on which
to impute to him the equally serious intention to kill B. The “dierent
person or dierent property” portion of the provision is what traditionally has been referred to as the doctrine of “transferred intent.”11 (The
provision of the Model Code is drafted in two parallel parts, in subsections (2) and (3), to account for the slightly dierent situations of
intentionally causing results and unintentionally risking results that occur — see the bracketed language in the oset, showing the language
dierence between the two subsections.)
The question that all this background analysis leads to is whether
the issue of proximate cause — “too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense” — is conceptually akin to the issue of culpable state
of mind as to causing a prohibited result, like the doctrines of
substituted mental elements such as transferred intent in subsections
(2)(a) and (3)(a), or whether it is conceptually akin to the denition of
the strength of the causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the prohibited result, like the but-for cause issue in subsection
(1)(a)?
Consider a rewrite of the Model Code's causation provision, as set
out in Graphic 2 infra, which uses the Code's proximate cause
language but restructures the subsections to treat the proximate
cause issue as the latter sort (a conduct-result relation issue), rather
than as the former sort (a culpable state of mind issue).
As in Graphic 1, the double lines border the but-for cause rule. The
bold single line borders the transferred-intent imputation-of-culpability
doctrine. In this formulation, the proximate cause rule, bordered by the
non-bold dotted line, is moved to that part of the causation denition
dening the required strength of the causal connection (treating it as
conceptually similar to the but-for cause requirement), rather than being part of the culpability-as-to-causing-the-prohibited-result
provision. This reformulation would seem to produce all of the results
that all agree are appropriate in the causation cases but, as explained
below, avoids both dispositional and conceptual complications.12
9

Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, § 5.1.

10

Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, § 5.1.

11

Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, § 5.1.

12

The rewrite uses the Model Code's language, in order to show how the drafter's
could have drafted it using their own terms. That language might be improved upon,
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however. A better formulation might read something like: “the result is not too remote
in its occurrence, too peculiar in its manner of occurrence, or too dependent upon
another's volitional act.”

1316

© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 6

Model Penal Code's Causation Error
II. Application Of The Model Penal Code's Proximate Cause
Analysis
Presumably the Model Code wants to give a proximate cause
remoteness defense to murder to D in the falling piano case, as it
should. After all, that would seem to be the point of its including the
proximate cause language in subsection (2)(b): “too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability
or on the gravity of his oense.”
Under the reformulated provision in Graphic 2, the application of the
falling piano facts to the statute is clear:
(1) Conduct is the cause of a result if:
(a) the conduct is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and
(b) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of
his oense.

The death by piano may be a but-for cause under (1)(a) but fails to
satisfy (1)(b) because the prohibited result, the death of V, is “too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense.” Hence, there is no
causal accountability and D is liable at most for the attempted murder
of V.
How is one to reach this same result under the Model Code's provision?
(2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an oense, the element is not established if the actual
result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor
unless:
. . .
(b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as
that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense.

The Model Code's provision is not about the strength of the causal
connection between D’s conduct and the prohibited death of another
human being, but rather is about D’s culpable state of mind as to the
death.
To understand how the Model Code provision works, consider a
case in which all would agree there is no proximate cause problem —
D ought not get a remoteness defense: D wants to kill V; he shoots
him in the chest; V dies. More specically, one might normally expect
that V would die because the bullet pierced his heart, which then
stops. D has some medical background and this is exactly what he
intends when he aims his shot at V’s heart. In fact, however, D’s shot
misses the heart and punctures a lung. V drowns in his own blood
from the internal bleeding.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 6
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I take it no one cares that V died by blood-drowning rather than by
heart stoppage. He ought to be liable for murder. In the reformulated
provision in Graphic 2, D’s conduct in shooting is a but-for cause of
the prohibited result — death of another human being — and it is “not
too remote or accidental . . ..” End of story.
Now consider the case under the Model Code's provision. Let us
work through that provision phrase by phrase: “When purposely or
knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an oense . . .”
— yes, murder is an oense of this sort — “the element is not
established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the
contemplation of the actor unless:” — This seems a bit odd. Do the
drafters mean to say “the element is established if the actual result is
within . . ..”? If so, why not say that? If they mean something else,
what could they mean? But let's continue. — “the actual result involves
the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated” —
V’s death was designed and contemplated and V’s death is what occurred, so this phrase seems to be satised; but what do they mean
by “actual result,” which they want to distinguish from the “result
designed or contemplated”? On these facts there is a dierence
between the two. D designed and contemplated death by heart stoppage but in fact got death by blood-drowning. Are they “the same
kind of injury or harm”? Hard to say. It depends on what you mean by
“same kind.” They both caused death but the organs injured were
dierent. Should that matter? If they are held to be not “the same
kind,” then apparently the required element of culpability as to causing
the result is not established, and D is not liable for murder, which
would clearly be an improper result. To get to the right result, then, we
must nd that they are the “same kind” (more on this later). — “and
[the actual result] is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his
oense.” — Again, what is meant here by “actual result”? Is it death
by blood-drowning? Apparently that is what the drafters have in mind,
in which case a jury would hopefully conclude (if they were following
all this analysis, which seems doubtful) that blood-drowning is “not
too remote or accidental . . .” as compared to the designed and
contemplated heart-stoppage. So, with luck, the Model Code could
get the jury to the correct result.
But the obvious question is, why such a mess? Why do we care at
all about whether D intended heart stoppage rather than blooddrowning? There is no apparent policy or theoretical reason to care
and, more importantly, there is nothing in the Model Code to suggest
that the Code's culpability requirements care. The Code's culpability
scheme is one in which the prosecution must prove culpability as to all
elements of the oense denition. If the oense requires that the
defendant by his conduct cause the death of another human being,
then the Code's scheme requires proof of the defendant's culpability
as to causing the death of another human being. Nowhere does the
1318

© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 6

Model Penal Code's Causation Error
Code's scheme require proof of culpability as to the manner of occurrence of the result.
D’s culpable state of mind as to hearth stoppage versus blooddrowning is irrelevant to the law, as irrelevant as his culpable state of
mind as to whether V was very scared when shot or was a talented
painter or was nice to his children. In some larger moral inquiry,
someone might think D’s culpable state of mind as to these circumstances might be relevant, but nothing in the Code makes them legally
relevant. Yet the drafters write section 2.03 as if culpability as to the
oense denition's stated prohibited result — culpability as to causing
the death of another human being — is not enough. They write section
2.03 as if the prosecution also must prove that the defendant had a
culpable state of mind as to the manner of occurrence of the prohibited
result.
There could be an oense in which culpability as to the manner of
occurrence was required. If an oense is dened as causing death by
poisoning, for example, then the prosecution would have to prove not
only that the defendant intended to cause the death but also intended
to cause it in that particular manner — by poisoning. But culpability as
to manner of occurrence is legally relevant only if the oense denition
makes it so, and this it almost never does.
Once the drafters took this odd, and erroneous, view of what
culpability as to causing was required, they had a serious practical
problem on their hands. It would be the rare case indeed in which a
prosecutor could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death had
occurred in exactly the manner in which the defendant had designed
or contemplated it. Indeed, if the defendant does not testify, how
would anyone ever know just what he designed or contemplated at
this level of detail. Such a vastly expanded culpability requirement
would produce a world in which one could never get a conviction for a
result element oense.
But the drafters had a solution to the problem. They would create a
general provision that would essentially impute to each actor the
culpability as to the manner of occurrence of a result (except in cases
of “too remote or accidental . . .”). From that contorted perspective,
the machinations of the Model Code's provision make sense:
(2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an oense, the element is not established if the actual result is
not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: . . .
(b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that
designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its
occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the
gravity of his oense.

If the actual result is “the same kind” as the result that is designed
or contemplated, then the required culpability as to manner of occurrence is established (unless too remote or accidental). (To make this
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 6
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work, of course, we have to assume that when the provision says the
required culpability element “is not established . . . unless . . .,” they
really mean it “is established if . . .,” so as to provide an armative
imputation of the required element.)
But the larger question is why bother with all this mess in the rst
place? The drafters' provision is solving a problem of their own making.
The problem disappears if they simply follow the Code's culpability
scheme and require culpability only as to the oense elements —
culpability as to causing the result prohibited by the offense definition,
that is, causing the death of another human being.
III. Why Would the Model Code Take Such an Odd and Troublesome Approach?
Given the unnecessary complexity and confusion of the Code's
formulation, which simply invites errors in interpretation and application, why would the drafters have taken such an approach? They
might have just made an unprovoked error in interpreting what the
Code's general culpability scheme required. But given how thoughtful
the drafters are, it seems more likely that there was some matter of
principle driving them toward this mess. It is only speculation, but the
answer may well lie in their erroneous conceptualization of proximate
cause as a matter of culpable state of mind rather than a matter of
conduct-result relation.13
If you started with the assumption that matters of proximate cause
are really matters of culpable state of mind, it would be easy to see
why one might want to shoehorn the “too remote or accidental . . .”
defense into a culpability context. How can one do that? The remoteness cases are commonly cases where something unexpected happens in the causal chain, so it is a small leap to conclude that where
this occurs, it must cause a failure to satisfy the culpable state of mind
requirement.
But remoteness problems won't normally negate required oense
culpability. In the falling piano case, D has the required culpability as to
causing V’s death. But if one expands the notion of required oense
culpability to include not just causing V’s death but also its manner of
occurrence, then the falling piano's remoteness does negate the
(expanded) culpability requirement.
What would make the drafters erroneously assume in the rst place
that proximate cause issues ought to be seen as oense culpability
requirements? Again, one can only speculate, but here is one theory.
The drafters' work on proximate cause was insightful in an important
respect. They took what the drafters called a “fresh approach” to
13

Perhaps they saw that the proximate cause issue required a general normative
judgment — “not too remote or accidental . . .” — and mistakenly equated this broad
sense of culpability with culpability in the narrow sense of a culpability element in an
oense denition?
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proximate cause.14 “Rather than seeking to systematize the varying
and sometimes inconsistent rules in the numerous areas in which the
problem has arisen,”15 the Code's formulation provides a general
standard, discussed previously: asking whether the result is “too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his oense.” In support of this
open-ended invitation to the intuitions of justice of judges and jurors,
the drafters cited recently published scholarship.16
Today, we might not see this as a terribly revolutionary insight. We
have a full literature on the importance of criminal law's expressive
function and the practical value of having it reect shared community
views, and have applied the insights to a wide range of criminal law
doctrines. But in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, in the midst of
the shift from rules without explicated reasons to the supposed
scientic application of the crime-control principles of deterrence and
incapacitation, this was indeed a new approach. The drafters used it
more than they might have realized, but they were rarely so open
about it.17
This open focus on general blameworthiness might have seemed to
them as conceptually related to familiar and important concept of offense culpable state of mind, which the Code pioneered in systematizing in its section 2.02. And the two are conceptually related. The latter, oense culpable state of mind requirements, is one aspect of the
former, the larger blameworthiness judgment. But it is only one aspect.
Excuse defenses are also part of that larger judgment, as are a host
of other doctrines. Note, for example, the Model Code's broad
standard for de minimis infractions, where defendant is given a defense
if his conduct caused “the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the
law dening the oense . . . only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
condemnation of conviction.”18
Adding to the potential for confusion is the dual use of the term
“culpability.” It is used in a broad sense as interchangeable with
general blameworthiness. But the same term is used, in a narrow
sense, to refer to the culpability requirements of the offense definition.
“An actor's culpability,” without context or further explanation, might
be either of these, culpability in the broad sense or in the narrow
sense. It is possible that this linguistic ambiguity helped mislead the
14

Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 254.

15

Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 255 to 56.

16

For example, they commonly cite the then-new H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore,
Causation in the Law (1959).
17

For a review of the Model Code provisions of this sort, see Paul H. Robinson,
Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive vs.
Normative Crime Control, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1839, 1851-57 (2000).
18

Model Penal Code § 2.12(2) (emphasis added).
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Model Code drafters into concluding that proximate cause, which had
recently been discovered to be best treated as a matter of culpability
(in the broad sense), should be drafted to as a matter of oense
culpable state of mind (the narrow sense of the term).
Of course, it is hard to know which came rst: the conceptual error
or the technical statutory interpretation error regarding proof of
culpability as to manner of occurrence. Did the drafters rst conclude
that proximate cause remoteness was a culpability (blameworthiness)
issue, then nd it convenient to require proof of culpability as to manner of occurrence in order to embody it in the Code? Or did the drafters rst conclude that culpability as to manner of occurrence must be
proven, then deduce that proximate cause remoteness must be a
culpability (oense culpable state of mind) issue? In the end, the
historical order of these tied errors does not matter. What matters is
that they have produced a set of practical and conceptual problems
that are unnecessary.
IV. Other Practical Problems With The Model Code's Approach
Part II has already illustrated the main practical problem with the
Model Code's approach: it creates unnecessary complexity and confusion that is sure to invite errors in interpretation and application. But
several additional points can be made to detail that conclusion.
First, the Code's approach introduces a new and unnecessary issue:
what constitutes “the same kind of injury or harm,” in subsections
(2)(b) and (3)(b)? If the actual manner of occurrence and the designed
and contemplated manner of occurrence are “the same kind,” then the
remoteness defense to accountability for the result is available; if they
are not “the same kind,” then it is not available. This, then, is a new
requirement with practical eect. Are maiming and death harms of
“the same kind”? Are puncturing a lung and puncturing a heart “the
same kind”? Without more, the term “kind” gives no eective guidance.
How is a judge or a jury to decide what to look at in deciding sameness or dierentness in “kind”?
Note that the reformulated provision, in Graphic 2, resolves the
proximate cause cases without ever having to rely upon such a
concept. The “same kind” problem is one created by the Model Code's
reconceptualization of proximate cause as an oense culpability issue.
Second, by characterizing the proximate cause remoteness defense
as a matter of failed required oense culpability, the Code invites errors where the missing culpability is properly imputed as transferred
intent or other substituted mental element. That is, subsections (a) and
(b) (in both sections (2) and (3)) oer alternative ways of imputing the
required culpability as to causing the prohibited result: (a) substituted
mental element, such as transferred intent, or (b) “same kind” and not
too remote. But if the required culpability is imputed under (a), then (b)
becomes irrelevant — and the proximate cause defense is lost. Once
the prosecution can impute under (a), it has no need to impute under
(b).
1322
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One can see the problem in a variation of the falling piano case: D
shoots at V with the intent to kill him, but it is V2, standing next to V,
who runs away and is killed by the falling piano. Is D accountable for
V2’s death; is he liable for the murder of V2? All agree that he should
not be. Just as D is only liable for the attempted murder of V, where
the piano kills V, so too should he be liable only for the attempted
murder of V2.19 The proximate cause problem is identical. Yet, the
Model Code provision might well be read to hold him liable for the
murder of V2, because subsection (2)(a) imputes the missing intention
needed for murder liability under the doctrine of transferred intent. By
treating proximate cause as simply a matter of culpability as to causing the prohibited result, it might be short-circuited when any other
doctrine imputing culpability has eect. Having imputed the missing
intention under “transferred intent,” subsection (2)(b) becomes
irrelevant.
One might argue that the Code avoids the problem by providing that
subsection (2)(a) imputes the required culpability only when “the actual
result diers from that designed or contemplated . . . only in the
respect that . . ..” Thus, one could argue that there is (appropriately)
no imputation even in the transferred intent case above because there
was another dierence between the actual and the intended results,
the remoteness dierence. But the problem with this solution is that
there will in every case always be some difference between the actual
result and the intended result. This means the requirement that the
victim dierence is the “only dierence” would never be satised, and
thus transferred intent would never be allowed.
Assume, for example, that there is a victim dierence — D meant to
kill V but instead killed V2 — but there also was a heart-stoppage
versus blood-drowning dierence. The existence of the latter would
mean that the victim dierence is not the “only dierence,” thus there
could be no transferred intent. Relying upon the “only dierence”
requirement to isolate subsections (a) from (b) simply makes subsection (a) collapse.
Note that nothing in the reformulated provision in Graphic 2 requires
the judge or jury to deal with this these issues: neither the problem of
short-circuiting the remoteness defense when there is imputation
under subsection (a), nor the problem of trying to give meaning to the
“only dierence” limitation that will not obliterate subsection (a).
Third, a similar problem arises with regard to strict liability oenses.
If no culpability is required as to the prohibited result, then, under the
Code's conceptualization, the proximate cause remoteness defense
drops out along with the culpability requirement. The remoteness
defense is available, under the Code's oense culpability approach,
19

On these facts, D is probably liable for the attempted murder of both V, directly,
and V2, under transferred intent.
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only as an exception to the Code's imputation of culpability as to manner of occurrence. If no such oense culpability is required, then the
remoteness defense never becomes available. This is a particularly
serious problem because felony murder is just such an oense of
strict liability as to causing the result, and the remoteness defense is
essentially the only limitation on that rule that is left to limit liability.
Luckily, the problem was pointed out to the drafters after they
published their Tentative Draft. Their solution was to add in the nal
draft a special provision, subsection (4):
(4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an oense
for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not
established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the
actor's conduct.20

But their proposed solution simply does not work. Because they
want to conceptualize the proximate cause remoteness issue as one
of oense culpable state of mind, they have lost their touchstone
when it comes to strict liability. For an oense of purpose or knowing,
they require that the defendant be purposeful or knowing as to the
manner of occurrence — they compare the actual result to that
“designed or contemplated,” as the case may be.21 For an oense of
recklessness or negligence, they require that the defendant be reckless or negligent as to the manner of occurrence — they compare the
actual result to the “risk of which the defendant is aware” or “should
have been aware,” as the case may be.22 But for an oense of strict
liability, what culpability is to be used as the vehicle for the proximate
cause remoteness defense?
They adopt a requirement that “the actual result is a probable
consequence of the actor's conduct” — the same requirement as they
use for oenses of recklessness and negligence. But this will be a
non-starter for those jurisdictions — the vast majority of jurisdictions
— that have rejected the Model Code's abolition of felony murder.23
They have expressly rejected a requirement of negligence as to causing the death. Why would they want to allow — or how could they be
conceptually consistent if they allowed — such a negligence requirement to be reintroduced through the denition of causation?
But even for the few jurisdictions that follow the Model Code's
abolition of felony murder, the section (4) patch hardly makes sense.
The drafters have gone on at great length about the value and
importance of their proximate cause language — “too remote or ac20

See Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 4 (considered at the ALI's May
1955 meeting); Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 253.
21

Model Penal Code § 2.03(2)(b), 2.03(3)(b).

22

Model Penal Code § 2.03(3)(a) to (b).

23

See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, at 555-56 (felony murder), 101-04
(presumptions).
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cidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability
or on the gravity of his oense” — in giving judges and juries some
guidance on how to think about the factors that ought to be relevant
in judging proximate cause.24 Yet, their section (4) patch fails to include
this language.
The drafters could have avoided the problem by simply using the
“too remote or accidental” language in subsection (4). But notice that
this would have made it essentially identical to the approach of the
reformulated provision in Graphic 2: simply requiring but-for and “not
too remote or accidental . . ..” And presumably that would have been
an abandonment of their reconceptualization of proximate cause as an
oense culpability issue rather than as a conduct-result connection
issue.
Note, again, this problem does not occur under the reformulated
provision, in Graphic 2. Under that approach, there is no need for a
special provision for strict liability oense. All oenses have the same
causation requirement: but-for plus “not too remote.”
V. Conclusion
The larger point here is that the issue of remoteness in proximate
cause is not simply a subset of the issue of oense culpable state of
mind, but rather is a dierent and independent issue more akin to the
but-for cause requirement, which denes the minimum required
strength of the causal connection between D’s act and the prohibited
result. The latter conceptualization of proximate cause allows the clear
and clean reformulation in Graphic 2, avoiding the complexities and
problems of the Model Code's formulation.
By attempting to treat proximate cause as a matter of oense
culpable state of mind, the drafters were doomed to a perverted view
of how to proceed. They ended up trying to x problems that did not
exist — problems that they had created for themselves — and
produced a provision that not only invites erroneous liability results
but also confuses the conceptual context of proximate cause.
The problems with the Code's approach recounted above may help
explain why most states, even those with Model Penal Code-based
criminal codes, reject the Code's causation provision. Every modern
American recodication — three-quarters of the states — are based
in signicant part on the Model Code, yet its approach to causation is
rejected in forty-three jurisdictions.25 [And in the nine states that have
the Model Code's causation section on its books, it has sown confusion and is commonly ignored or informally reinterpreted.
What is particularly unfortunate is that the Model Code really did
24

Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 255 to 56.

25

Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee. See Model Penal Code Ocial Commentaries § 2.03, at 264 n.22.
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have an important contribution to make on the issue. Its proximate
cause language — “not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense” — was a signicant improvement over what had previously
existed, which typically provided little or no guidance to judges and
juries or provided xed rules that were complicated yet incomplete
and often conicted with community intuitions of justice. The Code's
formulation at least gives decisionmakers a framework that helps them
think about the issue and to focus their attention on the relevant
factors.26 One can only hope that, while states may (properly) reject
the Model Code's conceptualization of proximate cause as culpability,
they nonetheless may appreciate and adopt its useful “not too remote
or accidental . . .” language, into a causation provision with a more
appropriate conceptualization, as in Graphic 2.
26

Some states have built upon the Model Code's language by adding the phrase:
and not too “dependent on another's volition act.” This helps highlight the shift in
relevant factors that occurs when the causal chain includes another human being.
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-3(b) to (c).
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